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Abstract
On 23 November 2013, the Chinese government created the Air Defense Identification Zone 
(ADIZ) in the East China Sea as ‘defensive emergency measures’ against the law-breaking conduct of 
a foreign aircraft. China’s unilateral action resulted in a tense situation in the East China Sea, although 
it guaranteed the freedom of overflight in the ADIZ (Rinehart & Elias, 2015; Carpenter, 2015). This 
paper discusses two points: (1) the impact of China’s ADIZ on the states/parties affected in the East 
China Sea, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States (U.S); and (2) the possibility 
of China creating an ADIZ in the South China Sea. In addition, the paper raises the following three 
points: (1) more time will be required to decisively evaluate the effect of the ADIZ; (2) China, Japan, 
and South Korea, among others, will need to expedite discussions on a framework of confidence-
building measures and on a crisis-management mechanism in the East and South China Sea; and (3) 
fundamentally, the careful and objective evaluation of China’s challenge and/or change of status quo 
in the region is necessary to understand China’s re-rise/return as a power in the region.
Key words: Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ); territorial and maritime dispute; 
                     East China Sea; South China Sea.
Transcommunication  Vol.3-1  Spring 2016
Graduate School of International Culture and Communication Studies
* This paper is a fully revised and extended version of an oral presentation at the Second London International Boundary Conference, on 
Tuesday, 1 December 2015, at the Royal Geographical Society, London, United Kingdom. The author wishes to thank those who provided 
thoughtful and stimulating comments on the original version. He also acknowledges the support given by the Waseda Academic Grants of 
2015 Tokutei Kadai.
Taisaku Ikeshima
152
Introduction
On 23 November 2013, the Chinese government established an Air Defense Identification Zone 
(ADIZ) in the East China Sea, with the goal of requiring aircraft flying in the East China Sea 
ADIZ to abide by specific rules (Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense 
Identification Zone) created by the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of 
China ?Map 1?. The aircraft flying the ADIZ are also required to provide the information on flight 
plan identification, radio identification, and other perimeters. The most controversial item within 
China’s unilateral legislative action is the third point listed in the Rules:
Third, aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone should follow 
the instructions of the administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification 
Zone or the unit authorized by the organ. China’s armed forces will adopt defensive 
emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in the identification or 
refuse to follow the instructions (emphasis added). 
The clear interpretation of China’s intention to adopt ‘defensive emergency measures’ against 
aircraft that do not comply with its instructions is problematic because a unilateral coercive action 
of this nature will, as have been widely reported by news coverage, result in a tense situation in 
East Asia.
Japan and China have been disputing over the attribution of the territorial sovereignty of 
the Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai Islands, although Japan has not officially admitted to a dispute. 
Japan lodged a strong protest against China, denying its legality and demanding its withdrawal. 
South Korea’s initial mild protest against China’s ADIZ was consequently enlarged to cover some 
controversially disputed areas in the region. Taiwan, although not regarded as a sovereign state but 
as part of China, filed a complaint, as the ADIZ would affect its flight administration. The U.S. 
expressed its deep concern regarding the ADIZ and its impact on the geopolitical and security 
issues in the region, although it did not take a position with respect to the territorial dispute. 
Therefore, the outcome of this unilateral action taken by China has widely affected the status quo 
of the region.
The purposes of this paper are: (1) to examine the impacts of China’s ADIZ on the territorial 
and maritime disputes in the East China Sea, with special reference to existing ADIZs’ boundaries 
and to consider, under international law, how the relationships between China and its neighbouring 
states have been affected by this action; and (2) to discuss the possible creation of an ADIZ by China 
in the South China Sea and its impact on the regional political and security situations. 
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MAP 1
[Source]  Global Time, 24 November 2013, at <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/827263.shtml>
               (accessed 5 January 2016)
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I. China’s Viewpoint
Based on the 23 November 2013 announcement, the legal basis of the establishment of an ADIZ 
by China is a domestic regulation known as ‘the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China 
Sea Air Defense Identification Zone’(Xinhua News HP). The introduction of the ADIZ in the 
region is justifiable as part of China’s right to self-defence and to safeguard sovereignty over its 
territory from a threat of foreign attack.
According to some commentators in news media, the purpose of the ADIZ is either to 
challenge the status quo in the region or to challenge Japan-U.S. security ties to maintain peace 
and stability in the Far East. Some suspect that China intends to exercise jurisdictional control 
of the disputed maritime area of the Senkaku Islands. This type of state action may cause 
neighbouring states to accuse China of its ‘creeping jurisdiction’ in the region. From a viewpoint 
of those who support the status quo in the East China Sea, a question arises as to whether China’s 
unilateral announcement of an ADIZ will, in the long run, cause Japan’s seemingly uncontested 
administrative control of the Senkaku Islands to be at risk (Rinehart & Elias, 2015). However, this 
current tense situation may be due to the fact that a 1972 shelving tacit understanding between 
Japan and China, although controversial and open to interpretation, was severely damaged, if 
not completely destroyed, by the Japanese government’s purchase, or nationalization, of three 
privately owned islands in the Senkaku Islands in September 2012. Both sides blame the other for 
causing the current situation.
Normally, neighbouring states would consult each other in advance regarding the 
establishment of an ADIZ to avoid conflict. This practice of prior consultation has been common 
in international society following the Second World War. Therefore, China’s unilateral ADIZ was 
created, apparently, in an unfriendly and unsophisticated manner, overlapping with Japan’s ADIZ, 
which was originally created by the U.S. and was largely succeeded by Japan in the 1950s ?Map 2?. 
It is not surprising that Japan severely condemned China for its coercive declaration of the ADIZ 
in the maritime area where a tense situation exists due to the conflict over the Senkaku Islands. 
Interestingly, however, the creation of an ADIZ, per se, is not prohibited under international law, 
and is not the same as the declaration of a territorial claim over a (disputed) territory.
Although the Chinese announcement may appear to be coercive and threatening, the 
Chinese government, including the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Foreign Ministry, 
added that ‘[n]ormal flights by foreign airlines in the Chinese ADIZ would not be affected’ (Chinese 
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, 2013). If this is really the case, the Chinese ADIZ will not affect 
the freedom of overflight, which is protected as part of freedom of the high seas under Article 87, 
paragraph 1, subparagraph (b), of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
A spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of National Defense also stated that China’s ADIZ is not a 
no-fly zone:
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China’s ADIZ was established to set aside enough time for early warning to defend 
the country’s airspace, with defense acting as the key point. The zone does not aim at 
any specific country or target, nor does it constitute a threat to any country or region. 
(CHINADAILY, 2013)
It has also been reported that China’s Civil Aviation Administration removed the ‘defensive 
emergency measures’ warning from the ADIZ rules in its Aeronautic Information Publication (AIP) 
in February 2014, although the warning remains in the Defense Ministry of China rules (Kurashige, 
Asahi Shimbun, 28 December 2014). Practically, therefore, no impediment may be found in 
practice unless one needs a theoretical outlook and structural understanding of the multilateral 
relations in East Asia. This paper then turns to the legal significance of the notion of ADIZ under 
international law.
　MAP 2
[Source]  Japanese Ministry of Defense, ‘China’s Activities Surrounding Japan’s Airspace’, at 
<http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/ryouku/> (accessed 5 January 2016)
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II. ADIZ Under International Law
There is no clear written rule governing ADIZ under international law (Waxman, 2014; Ashley 
Roach, 2015). In other words, there is no formal agreement on the creation of an ADIZ or 
procedural controls implemented within an ADIZ, although a certain number of ADIZs were 
created following the end of the Second World War. State practices concerning the creation of an 
ADIZ under certain circumstances were first realized when the U.S. created ADIZs during the Cold 
War in the 1950s in order to ‘manage the air threat from the Soviet Union’ (Hsu, 2014, p. 2). In this 
regard, it may be said that the ADIZs in East Asia are, in essence, a legacy of the San Francisco 
Peace Settlement during the Cold War. The precedence of the U.S. ADIZs has been followed 
by other states in almost the exact same manner. Interestingly, however, US recent practice 
demonstrates that most violations of the U.S. ADIZ are ‘by the lowest cost and least well-equipped 
aircraft likely operated by a single crew’ largely due to the misinformation given to those pilots and 
miscommunication between them and the air traffic controller concerned (Zuschlag, pp. 32-34).
When a state unilaterally creates an ADIZ, tensions between the state and its neighbouring 
states will be obviously raised. Concerning the state practice of establishing an ADIZ, an 
overlapping ADIZ is not ‘unusual and can be managed co-operatively as is the case with the U.S. 
and Canada’ (Valencia, 2013). This is mainly because the states concerned typically consult or 
negotiate to accommodate the geographical setting of the zones. In other words, the conditions to 
create an ADIZ basically depend on the relationship between the states concerned. At the same 
time, it is unimaginable for a state to create an ADIZ unilaterally over another state’s already 
established ADIZ, and which lies over disputed territory. This subsequent one-way conduct would 
obviously be threatening and hostile enough to invite an adversarial reaction from opponents. 
However, one may wonder whether Japan had the initial authority at all to create an ADIZ over 
disputed land or not. This question will be answered below.
More than twenty countries have created ADIZs over the maritime areas surrounding their 
territories for security purposes prior to China’s declaration (Calvo, 2013; Lee, 2014). As the 
precedence of the U.S. ADIZs has been followed, a commentator goes so far as to state that ‘it 
may be presumed that the right to declare an ADIZ is now recognized as a right under customary 
international law’ (Ashley Roach, 2015; Lee, 2014). However, the legal basis of this practice is 
not free from criticism under international law. Another commentator criticises its lack of a legal 
foundation to justify its use, as the U.S. practice still requires wider and more consistent support in 
the international society (Valencia, 2015). 
In general, an ADIZ may coexist with a Flight Information Region (FIR), which is a ‘specified 
region of airspace in which a flight information service and an alerting service (ALRS) are provided’ 
(Ashley Roach, 2015) in accordance with a regional air navigation agreement approved by the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). They substantially differ, in that the former 
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controls jurisdiction of a certain aerial zone for the state’s own territorial security, while the latter 
administers the safety flight of aircrafts under common rules regulated by the ICAO. The notion of 
an ADIZ is primarily for the purpose of the state’s own security, regardless of its intention to occupy 
the territory concerned. Therefore, any unilateral action, whether prescriptive or administrative, will 
easily incur a tension in the concerned region, regardless of what manner the action was taken. In 
order to seek a third party mechanism of dispute settlement, one might consider the possibility of 
utilizing the procedures by the ICAO Council under Article 84 of the Convention on International 
Civil Aviation of 1944. However, this approach would depend on whether ADIZ matters would be 
within the scope of the function of the ICAO, which primarily oversees civil aviation.
Practically, however, the establishment of an ADIZ in a certain area may imply that the 
state establishing the ADIZ retains an intention to exert an influential impact upon the covered 
zone, so that the affected states will be intimidated upon entering or passing. This kind of chilling 
effect, with the possibility of taking a forceful measure by coastal states, may create tension and/or 
deteriorate the current situation in the region. Therefore, one can rightly assume that ADIZs beyond 
the limits of the territorial sea would be ‘incompatible with the status of waters beyond the limit of 
the territorial sea, at least if they involved the application of powers of prevention or punishment in 
regard to foreign vessels or aircraft’ (Brownlie, 2008, p. 198; Crawford, 2012, p. 280).
In summary, the following three points are noteworthy, as the present author once pointed 
out elsewhere (Ikeshima, 2014, p. 55). First, the legality of an ADIZ primarily depends on how the 
coastal state implements the defensive measure in reality. Second, relevant rules of international 
law are not established under the circumstance where national security is under great peril 
and danger before an eminent urgent situation due to the remarkable development of military 
technology. Third, UNCLOS, to which the U.S. has not yet acceded, remains dependent on the 
consequent practice of the states concerned, as UNCLOS parallels customary law.
III. The Impact of China’s ADIZ on Neighbouring States in the Region
1. Japan
The Japanese government lodged a protest with the Chinese government soon after the latter made 
the announcement regarding the establishment of an ADIZ in the East China Sea. The protest was 
followed by the Japanese government’s instruction to its air companies not to abide by China’s 
ADIZ rules, as this would imply that Japan accepted it.
As the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute between Japan and China was ongoing, the coverage 
by China’s ADIZ of the disputed islands created a tense situation to U.S. interests in the region 
under the Japan-U.S. security ties (Drifte, 2014). This is partly because China’s ADIZ overlaps 
with the Japanese ADIZ. However, the original of Japan’s ADIZ was created by the U.S. in the 
early 1950s, and Japan succeeded it from the U.S. during the Cold War (Gil, 2013). 
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The United States’ official position with respect to the disputed islands is based on Article V, 
paragraph 1, of the 1960 Japan-US Security Treaty:
Article V
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against their Party in the territories under the 
administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it 
would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and 
processes. (Emphasis added)
This provision obliges the U.S. to defend the islands as a Japanese territory, and is applicable to the 
islands in question on the ground that the U.S. recognizes them to be ‘under the administrative control 
of Japan’. In this regard, the U.S. distinguishes between territorial sovereignty over, and administrative 
control of, land. It has been reported that Japan has remained vigilant since its Coast Guard observed 
not a Chinese maritime police boat but a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy vessel ‘for the first 
time’ navigating in a ‘peculiar’ manner on the border of China’s ADIZ (Asia Times, 23 November 
2015). One interpretation of this conduct may be that China is conducting reconnaissance activities by 
examining the boundaries of its ADIZ and is showing off its naval presence therein.
At the same time, however, it is not easy to understand the U.S. policy concerning the 
disputed islands, under which the U.S. government does ‘not take a position on the sovereignty’ of 
them (Manyin, 2013; Drifte, 2014). The U.S. position has been widely criticised and is considered 
controversial for its ambiguity with respect to the relationship between the territorial sovereignty 
of the disputed islands and the administrative control of the occupying state. One interpretation 
for this position may be a diplomatic compromise to utilize practically a theoretical excuse to 
maintain the status quo without becoming unnecessarily involved in other countries’ territorial 
disputes at the sacrifice of the fully guaranteed satisfaction of the parties concerned. This is 
why, at the request of the Japanese government, the U.S. Department of Defense has repeatedly 
and publicly issued the same statement that Article V of the 1960 Japan-U.S. Mutual Security 
Treaty is applicable to the Senkaku Islands (Hughes, 2015, p. 70). However, there is no practical 
guarantee regarding the actual response of the U.S. in an urgent and dangerous situation under 
the provision, due to the vague condition of the paragraph mentioned above, ‘in accordance with 
its constitutional provisions and processes’. This wording may imply that a failure of the U.S. 
Administration to obtain an endorsement of Congress may block an actual military deployment.
Furthermore, Japan may be open to criticism because of its arbitrary ADIZ and inconsistency 
in its coverage. The following two points are noteworthy. First, Japan’s ADIZ covers neither the so-
called Northern Territories off the north-eastern coasts of Hokkaido, whose territorial sovereignty 
Japan claims against the current occupier, Russia, nor the Takeshima Island, while the Senkaku 
Islands are within its scope. Neither the Ogasawara Islands, nor the Okinotorishima Island, is 
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included in the scope of Japan’s ADIZ, whereas none of these islands’ territorial sovereignty is 
disputed. The coverage of the Japanese ADIZ is, therefore, deemed to be principally for the purpose 
of the mainland’s security, while avoiding conflict with neighbouring states, including Russia and 
South Korea, whose effective control over the disputed islands has been apparently stable.
Second, the Japanese ADIZ coexists with the South Korean ADIZ (KADIZ), which was 
created on 22 March 1951, over the Takeshima/Dokdo Island, which Japan and South Korea have 
been disputing for more than 50 years (Gil, 2013), even though South Korea does not admit there 
is any dispute over the island. Following China’s ADIZ announcement, South Korea extended its 
KADIZ to cover the Ieodo/Suyan Rock ?Map 3?. Prior to this, the KADIZ did not overlap with 
　    MAP 3
[Source] GlobalSecurity.org, ‘ROK Air Defense Identification Zone’, at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/
              military/world/rok/adiz.htm> (accessed 5 January 2016)
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Japan’s ADIZ, but existed side-by-side in the northeastern part of the East China Sea, in particular, 
sharing a border with the Japanese’s ADIZ. In addition, South Korea also enlarged KADIZ 
southerly to cover the Ieodo, overlapping with both China’s and Japan’s ADIZs. Therefore, the 
area where the Ieodo is located has a triple overlap of ADIZs. It is noteworthy that Japan and 
South Korea jointly conducted naval exercise in December 2013, following China’s unilateral 
announcement of an ADIZ, because this joint naval exercise may mean the maintenance of 
minimum security cooperation between Japan and South Korea, despite diplomatic conflicts (Green 
& Cooper, 2015, p. 72).
This paper now turns to the impact of China’s ADIZ on the Korean situation in the 
following.
2. South Korea1
China’s establishment of an ADIZ in the East China Sea also caused the expansion of the KADIZ 
on 8 December 2013, eliminating the status quo of the tripartite equilibrium in the maritime and 
aerial zone of that region. This status quo, however, was dependent on a very fragile and unstable 
situation created by the U.S. during and after the 1950s under the Pax Americana established 
following the Korean War in the Far East when China was still struggling to build its communist 
economy after the 1949 Revolution.
South Korea’s actions were significant because the expansion of the KADIZ took place 
after consultation with the U.S., China, and Japan, irrespective of gaining a successful consent 
from its counterpart. This cooperative action may have not created a conflict in the region initially, 
while overlapping the three countries’ ADIZs is now more complicated and requires sensitive 
coordination among the states to avoid a possible unexpected military incident or accident.
A geographical feature known as Ieodo in Korean, or Suyan Rock in Chinese, is a 
submerged reef in the overlapping exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of South Korea and China, 
and has been in dispute not of territorial sovereignty over, but of jurisdiction over, the feature. 
There appears to be a clear definition regarding the submerged rock in UNCLOS (Churchill & 
Lowe, 1999), but Article 17, paragraph 2, of UNCLOS stipulates:
Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance exceeding the breadth of the 
territorial sea from the mainland or an island, it has no territorial sea of its own.
A claim over a submerged rock/reef cannot be made, so no actual territorial dispute between these 
two countries exists; however, maritime jurisdiction remains an issue (Roehring, 2012). South 
Korea constructed, and has maintained, an ocean research station on a platform above the reef 
since 2003. China has regularly protested against South Korea’s action and its subsequent exercise 
of jurisdiction based on this construction.
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The fundamental concern with Ieodo is the delimitation of the overlapping EEZs between 
these two countries, leading to the regulation and control of illegal fishing in and around the 
relevant maritime area in the region. However, the current overlapping AIDZ issue creates a more 
complicated situation because the overflight of the EEZ for the patrol purpose requires effective 
coordination between South Korea and China, to avoid a clash between the two countries’ 
fishermen and/or state authorities over the regulation of illegal fishing in the area. 
Therefore, the delimitation of the EEZs of these states is closely related to the scope and 
function of their ADIZs in the East China Sea (Ashley Roach & Smith, 2012, pp. 345-361). 
Moreover, this practical aspect is more problematic regarding the relationships between the 
operation of the ADIZ and the application and interpretation of high seas freedom, particularly 
when a coastal state exercises its jurisdiction in the ADIZ in order to regulate foreign aircraft flying 
over the EEZ of the coastal state. It is maintained that ‘balancing the military interests of all states’ 
is important ‘to promote stability and respect within the international community’ (Dutton, 2009, 
p. 709). The legality of the coastal state’s regulation in the ADIZ is still yet to be decided, since it 
depends on the balance between the coastal state’s jurisdiction and the freedom of overflight. 
3. Taiwan2
Taiwan also claims sovereignty over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands. In that sense, Taiwan may 
be regarded as a party in the territorial dispute, only if it is considered so. Among the states in 
that region, Taiwan is legally part of China, which is intriguing to consider given the current 
complicated situation in the East China Sea. Taiwan has its own policy to peacefully settle the 
territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands with all parties concerned.
Upon the unilateral creation of the Chinese ADIZ, Taiwan instructed its air carriers to 
follow the regulations of China by submitting flight plans to the Chinese authorities, although it 
denied the recognition of the ADIZ created by China. In fact, the Chinese ADIZ overlaps with the 
Taiwanese ADIZ, which was established far in advance of China’s ADIZ and partially covers the 
mainland of China and beyond the Taiwan Strait. It is believed that this overlap is said to be the 
reason why the U.S. does not recognize Taiwan’s ADIZ (Rinehart & Elias, p. 22).
Once again, China’s ADIZ overlaps with the ADIZs of neighbouring states, including 
Japan and Taiwan. Regardless of its protest due to the overlapping with its own ADIZ, Taiwan 
had suffered from the slight erosion of the ADIZ of Japan in 2010, which was intended, by the 
extension, to cover the entirety of the Yonaguni Island ?Map 4?. This incident implies that the 
ADIZ is dynamic and extends itself in accordance with the state’s intention, policy, and capacity. 
For Taiwan, the management of its own ADIZ is not an easy task in terms of its bilateral 
relations with the U.S. as a protecting state and China as an opposing state. On one hand, the U.S. 
objected to Taiwan’s establishing an ADIZ, which stretched to the Chinese continent since it was 
concerned about the possible tension over the Taiwanese Strait. On the other hand, there has been 
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a tacit agreement between Taiwan and China to maintain the status quo not to cross the median 
line of the Strait, in practice (Rinehart & Elias, p. 22).
Thus, regarding China’s ADIZ with respect to its relationship to Taiwan’s ADIZ, the 
question is whether both countries will be able to manage the practicalities to handle the 
overlapping zones without affecting the bilateral relations. As the overlapping zones do not cover 
the Diaoyutai/Diaoyudao Islands, there appears to be no direct impact of this double coverage on 
the territorial dispute of the islands.
4. United States
The U.S. reaction to the Chinese announcement of the creation of an ADIZ in the East China 
Sea was relatively sound and appeared low-key, despite its unequivocal protest to the Chinese 
government. For the U.S., which does not recognise China’s unilateral action, the establishment of 
an ADIZ by the Chinese government was regarded as an action to coercively alter the status quo 
in East Asia. It is intriguing, however, that the U.S. did not demand that China withdraw the ADIZ 
declaration, despite its non-recognition of the conduct. In the Hearing on the Rebalance to the 
Asia-Pacific Region of the House Armed Services Committee on 28 January 2014, a U.S. official 
stated that China ‘does not challenge U.S. national security’.
　         MAP 4
[Source] Shih Hsiu-chuan, ‘Japan Extends ADIZ into Taiwan Space’, Taipei Times, 26 June 2010, at 
              <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2010/06/26/2003476438> 
              (accessed 5 January 2016)
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What is far more confusing is the fact that, while the U.S. did not fail to question China 
diplomatically and militarily, it also announced at the very early stages that its air carriers would 
follow China’s instructions to submit flight plans:
The U.S. government generally expects that U.S. carriers operating internationally will 
operate consistent with NOTAMs (Notices to Airmen) issued by foreign countries. Our 
expectation of operations by U.S. carriers consistent with NOTAMs does not indicate U.S. 
government acceptance of China’s requirements for operating in the newly declared ADIZ. 
(U.S. Department of State, 2013)
It is not easy for East Asian states, in particular, to understand U.S. foreign policy concerning the 
reconciliation between the non-recognition of the Chinese unilateral action and the concession to 
the declaration and rules. In this regard, China’s ADIZ may be variously interpreted, depending 
on the evaluation of its intention and regional strategy. One commentator presents a wider point of 
view:
China’s regional maritime strategy appears to have as its aim to reverse the tectonic shift 
brought about two centuries ago by the introduction of superior foreign naval technology 
and to restore the regional system to its continental past. (Dutton, 2014, p. 4)
It is beyond the scope of the present paper to analyse the historical background of China’s regional 
maritime strategy, but this sort of broader viewpoint concerning a regional order is noteworthy, 
regardless of its conclusion. 
One reasonable interpretation may be that the U.S. had no other choice but to take a 
pragmatic approach to avoid an undesirable scenario, such as the tragedy of civilian casualties by 
the shooting down of a civilian aircraft, which did not follow the Chinese ADIZ regulations, for 
example. This kind of double-standard policy may remind some of the U.S. policy on territorial 
disputes. Regarding the Senkaku Islands dispute, the U.S. does not take a position on sovereignty 
issue, whereas, responding to a request from the Japanese government, it repeatedly admits the 
applicability of the specific provision in the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty of 1960 to ‘act to 
meet the common danger’ in accordance with each party’s constitutional provisions and processes’ 
(Art. V). In addition, the U.S. rented one of the islets of the Senkaku Islands as a U.S. bombing 
range, though this islet has not been in use since 1978.
There has been no actual conflict in the Chinese ADIZ, despite the fact that Japan and the U.S. 
have jointly increased their reconnaissance and surveillance activities in the region. During his 
visit in December 2013, U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden urged Tokyo, Beijing, and Seoul to show 
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self-restraint with respect to the ADIZ-related issues (Daugirdas & Mortenson, 2014, pp. 106-
109). The consecutive tripartite reconciliation to recover normal diplomatic relations among the 
three states has significantly served to bring the relative stability in the East China Sea, except for 
some minor frictions through the routine patrolling by the state, or naval boats and fleets in and 
around the disputed maritime areas.
IV. Possibility of a Chinese ADIZ in the South China Sea3
The maritime areas in East Asia and South East Asia are complex due to the overlapping ADIZs in 
the East China Sea and multiple coexisting ADIZs in this region. In addition to the ADIZs already 
mentioned, the Philippine and Vietnamese ADIZs are among those in the region which peacefully 
coexistence ?Map 5??Map 6?. The Philippine ADIZ is side-by-side with the Taiwanese ADIZ, 
whose southern edge overlaps that of the Philippine’s. The Vietnamese ADIZ is located in the 
South China Sea and thus far is without any conflicts or overlaps with other countries. 
Against the background of China’s assertive and expansionist attitude in the maritime areas 
around its coast in East Asia, the next stage of high profile territorial and maritime expansions is 
the South China Sea, where China’s incessant construction and fortification of the artificial islands 
have attracted attention, resulting in tension with Vietnam and the Philippines, in particular. 
China’s territorial claim over the South China Sea is principally based on the historic background, 
in addition to relevant legal norms in the region. One cannot easily understand China’s viewpoints 
concerning its claim partly because its territorial claim does not fit in the traditional framework of 
international law, which is founded on the concept of the Westphalian system. China appears to 
have a different viewpoint with respect to the development of legal norms governing the former 
Chinese sphere of influence such as East Asia. A typical example of this type of reasoning may 
be the so-called nine dash line on which China claims its territorial sovereignty over the maritime 
area (Ikeshima, 2013).
The U.S. and Japan, among others, have expressed concerns with a series of recent 
incidents between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. This tension will heighten as China has 
recently completed construction of an airstrip on the Fiery Cross Reef of the Spratly Islands in 
the South China Sea. The aerial sphere of control by China in the South China Sea, as well as the 
accumulation of the fait accompli, such as the construction of an artificial island, to solidify its 
territorial claim over the maritime area may increase the risk of military incidents among the states. 
In this context, China’s creation of an ADIZ in this region will be an issue in the South China Sea.
In contrast with what has generally been concerned about, the Chinese government has 
unequivocally stated that it is not its intention to create an ADIZ in the South China Sea. At the 
same time, however, China stresses that when and whether or not it will establish one will solely 
depend upon the degree of threat from abroad.
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‘Hua Chunying responded that China is entitled to set up ADIZs. A decision in this regard 
depends on whether the air safety is threatened and to what extent it is threatened. A whole 
range of factors should also be taken into account before establishing an ADIZ, Hua added.’ 
(China’s Ministry of Defense, 7 May 2015)
From this statement, one can imply that China will remain both passive and responsive, whereas 
the U.S. and others, who prefer the status quo in the region, will act in an opposite way regarding 
　        MAP 5  Air Defense Identification Zones in East Asia
[Source] Rinehart, I.E. & B. Elias, China’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ),
              Congressional Research Service, R43894, January 30, 2015, p. 8.
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China’s future conduct. If the latter regard China’s behaviour and attitude as a threat, then it will 
react and strike a balance in the region. However, it is not easy to recognize which side is the 
instigator of a hostile action, as this is similar to the chicken-and-egg question and the security 
dilemma due to the lack of mutual trust. Although no one is certain of the real intentions of the 
Chinese government, what is fundamental among the multilateral relationships in the region is the 
so-called perception gap among them, or mistrust with each other.
It is easy to suspect that there will continuously be a conflict between China and the U.S. 
over the possibility of China creating an ADIZ in the region, as the situation remains tense. For 
China, this tension will largely depend on U.S. surveillance and reconnaissance activities in the 
South China Sea. For other stakeholders in the maritime region, China’s asymmetrical military 
capability with its rapid and intensive reclaiming and muscling activities are the principal factor 
for the growing tension.
Whether there may be an option of ‘Anti-Access/Area Denial’ (A2/AD), the possibility of 
an ADIZ in the South China Sea may serve as a useful and effective alternative for China to check 
on the movement of the U.S., particularly for China’s own security and territorial integrity in the 
　     MAP 6  Overlapping ADIZ's in Northeast Asia after S Korea Expansion  
[Source] Lai, D., ‘A Few Questions about China’s Air Identification Zone and Its Aftermath’, 21 
March 2014, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, at < http://www.
strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/A-Few-Questions-About-Chinas-Air-
Defense-Identification-Zone-and-Its-Aftermath/2014/03/21> (accessed 5 January 2016).
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region. In other words, the exercise of its right or discretion to declare an ADIZ is a diplomatic 
and political card for China to play, regardless of how unfriendly and/or unsophisticated it may be. 
China’s defensive or coercive nature depends on the practical manner or mode in which the actual 
measures are taken.
Moreover, China may also have other possible maritime areas to establish an ADIZ, such 
as the Gulf of Tonkin, the Yellow Sea, and the Taiwan Strait, regardless of the consequences. The 
gravity of the outcomes would depend on the relationships with Vietnam, South and North Koreas, 
and Taiwan, respectively, in accordance with the scope of the AIDZ’s established. If a new ADIZ 
has no overlap with another country’s ADIZ, its establishment will reduce any tension that may 
arise. Furthermore, its practical use and modality will also depend on the actual impact and the 
political and diplomatic consequences in the region.
However, the fundamental question is whether the proliferation of ADIZs in the East and 
South China Seas will contribute to the maintenance of the regional peace and stability. It would 
be self-evident that nobody desires the aggravated tension in the South China Sea brought about 
by the proliferated ADIZs therein.
Conclusion
The East Asian states and others that are affected by China’s ADIZ need to prudently consider 
whether the ADIZ established is actually a ‘paper tiger’ or an actual threat. It may be true that this 
type of unilateral measure tends to have a chilling effect on the states whose aircrafts enter and/
or pass the ADIZ. However, what is more significant is its concrete (non-)effect on the freedom 
of overflight guaranteed under the law of the sea, including UNCLOS. No significant coercive 
measure has reportedly been taken by China yet, although a longer timeframe is required to 
observe China’s state action with respect to the ADIZ before any decisive evaluation of the ADIZ 
and its practical operation. Since the fundamental concern regarding the ADIZ is closely linked 
to the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (Calvo, 2013, p. 45), 
the Chinese government could be pursuing a situation where the Japanese government officially 
admits the existence of the territorial dispute in order to return to the shelving of the dispute per 
se. Therefore, one should not be narrow-sighted even after China’s ADIZ was declared and has 
created a tense situation in the region. 
A more urgent issue regarding the overlapping ADIZs in the East China Sea is the 
avoidance of an accidental incident, which may lead to a major confrontation between the states 
concerned unless any prior preventive measures are taken as a result of cooperative consultation 
and negotiation. Therefore, China, Japan, and South Korea are, among others, must expedite 
the discussion on a framework of confidence-building measures and on a crisis-management 
mechanism in order for them to prevent any minor incidents. Non-proliferation of an ADIZ in the 
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East and South China Seas, for example, will be required, particularly in the maritime areas where 
a territorial/maritime dispute currently exists. Otherwise, the tension in East Asia would become 
worse than the tension during the Cold War era.
In the case of China’s ADIZ, what is fundamental is the careful and objective evaluation 
of China’s challenge and/or change of status quo in the region (Ikeshima, 2014). This aspect 
will lead to questioning how to cope with China’s ‘re-rise’ (Armitage-Nye, 2012) and to accept 
China as ‘a returning power’ in this region (Kissinger, 2012, p. 546). One should not exaggerate 
or underestimate China and what it is doing in East Asia. At present, China’s development and 
growth as a re-rising/returning power is unprecedented in world history (Ikeshima, 2013). One 
may recall a similar but fundamentally different case in the 1945 Truman Proclamations on the 
continental shelf and the conservation of fisheries, which led to the emergence of customary 
norm with wide and consistent support in the international society soon after the Second World 
War. The distinct historical, geographical, and geopolitical background of China as a ‘civilization 
state’ (Jacques, 2012) eloquently demonstrates the limits of the Westphalian system of the current 
situation of Asia and the future prospect of an ‘Eastphalian system’ (Coleman & Maogoto, 2013) 
in the contemporary and future world.
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Endnotes
1 South Korea, or the Republic of Korea, created a district, known as the Rhee Syngman Line, which this 
paper does not specifically address.
2 The official name of Taiwan is the Republic of China. Its legal status is controversial, but, in accordance 
with the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué, Taiwan is not regarded as a state in this paper.
3 There are actually several states involved in the South China Sea dispute, but this paper does not discuss 
the ADIZs of all the states concerned in the dispute.
